Institutional Theory. Di Indonesia adalah untuk mengelola instansi rumah sakit seperti model pengelola-an di sektor swasta tanpa mengabaikan kepentingan negara, hal ini dapat dilihat dari pengelolaan ala swasta yang masih diatur dalam perundang-undangan sehingga dipilih model BLU/ BLUD yang menekankan pengadopsian sistem sektor. Corporate governance refers to the private and public institutions, including laws, regulations and accepted business practices, which together govern the relationship, in a market economy, between corporate managers and entrepreneurs (corporate insiders) on one hand, and those who invest.
Institutional investors have the resources and specialized knowledge for extensively researching a variety of investment options not open to. Because institutions are the largest force behind in securities markets, they perform the majority of trades on major exchanges and greatly influence the prices of securities. For this reason, retail investors often research institutional investors’ regulatory filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to determine which securities the retail investors should buy personally.
Retail investors typically do not invest in the same securities as institutional investors to avoid paying higher prices for the securities. Invest in bonds, options, futures contracts and stocks. However, because of the nature of the securities and/or the manner in which transactions occur, some markets are primarily for institutional investors rather than retail investors.
Examples of such markets primarily for institutional investors include the and. Retail investors pay brokerage firm fees along with marketing and distribution costs for each trade. In contrast, institutional investors send trades through to exchanges independently or through intermediaries; they negotiate a fee for each transaction and avoid paying marketing and distribution costs.
Retail investors buy and sell stocks in of 100 shares or more; institutional investors buy and sell in of 10,000 shares or more. Because of the larger trade volumes, institutional investors avoid buying stocks of smaller companies and acquiring a high percentage of company ownership.
The investment cannot be sold when desired for little or no loss in value and performing such an act may violate securities laws. For example, mutual funds, closed-end funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) registered as diversified funds are restricted as to the percentage of a company’s voting securities the funds can own. Conversely, retail investors find small companies’ lower stock prices attractive; they can invest more diversified portfolios in smaller price ranges than larger ones.
To what extent do individuals choose their courses of action largely on the basis of a calculation of costs and benefits? And to what extent, on the contrary, are their actions importantly driven by the normative assumptions they share with other individuals with whom they interact? Mark Granovetter formulated this foundational question for the social sciences in his important 1985 contribution to the American Journal of Sociology, 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness'. He used the concept of embeddedness as a way of capturing the idea that the actions individuals choose are importantly refracted by the social relations within which they function. This is a topic we've addressed frequently in prior posts under the topic of the social actor, and Granovetter's contribution is an important one to consider as we try to further clarify the issues involved.The large distinction at issue here is the contrast between rational actor models of the social world, in which the actor makes choices within a thin set of context-independent decision rules, and social actor models, in which the actor is largely driven by a context-defined set of scripts as he/she makes choices. The contrast is sometimes illustrated by contrasting neoclassical economic models of the market with substantivist models along the lines of Karl Polanyi's, and it links to the debate in economic anthropology between formalists and substantivists.
Here is how Granovetter puts the fundamental question:How behavior and institutions are affected by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory. (481)He argues that neither of the polar positions are tenable.
The formalist approach errs in taking too a-social view of the actor:Classical and neoclassical economics operates, in contrast, with an atomized, undersocialized conception of human action, continuing in the utilitarian tradition. In classical and neoclassical economics, therefore, the fact that actors may have social relations with one another has been treated, if at all, as a frictional drag that impedes competitive markets.
(483, 484)But the extreme alternative isn't appealing either:More recent comments by economists on 'social influences' construe these as processes in which actors acquire customs, habits, or norms that are followed mechanically and automatically, irrespective of their bearing on rational choice. (485)So action doesn't reduce to abstract optimizing rationality, and it doesn't reduce to inflexible cultural or normative scripts either. Instead, Granovetter proposes an approach to this topic that reframes the issue around a more fluid and relational conception of the actor. Like the pragmatist theories of the actor discussed in earlier posts (, ), he explores the idea that the actor's choices emerge from a flow of interactions and shifting relations with others. The actor is not an atomized agent, but rather a participant in a flow of actions and interactions.At the same time, Granovetter insists that this approach does not deny purposiveness and agency to the actor. The actor reacts and responds to the social relations surrounding him or her; but actions are constructed and refracted through the consciousness, beliefs, and purposes of the individual.The idea of embeddedness is crucial for Granovetter's argument; but it isn't explicitly defined in this piece.
The idea of an 'embedded' individual is contrasted to the idea of an atomized actor; this implies that the individual's choices and actions are generated, in part anyway, by the actions and expected behavior of other actors. It is a relational concept; the embedded actor exists in a set of relationships with other actors whose choices affect his or her own choices as well. And this in turn implies that the choices actors make are not wholly determined by facts internal to their spheres of individual deliberation and beliefs; instead, actions are importantly influenced by the observed and expected behavior of others.Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. (487)Some of Granovetter's discussion crystallizes around the social reality of trust within a system of economic actors. Trust is an inherently relational social category; it depends upon the past and present actions and interactions within a group of actors, on the basis of which the actors choose courses of action that depend on expectations about the future cooperative actions of the other actors. Trust for Granovetter is therefore a feature of social relations and social networks:The embeddedness argument stresses instead the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or 'networks') of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. (490)And trust is relevant to cooperation in all its variants - benevolent and malicious as well.
As Granovetter points out, a conspiracy to defraud a business requires a group of trusting confederates. So it is an important sociological question to investigate how those bonds of trust among thieves are created and sustained.This line of thought, and the theory of the actor that it suggests, is an important contribution to how we can understand social behavior in a wide range of contexts. The key premise is that individuals choose their actions in consideration of the likely choices of others, and this means that their concrete social relations are critical to their actions. How frequently do a set of actors interact? Has there been a history of successful cooperation among these actors in the past? Are there rivalries among the actors that might work to reduce trust? These are all situational and historical facts about the location and social relations of the individual.
And they imply that very similar individuals, confronting very similar circumstances of choice, may arrive at very different patterns of social action dependent on their histories of interaction with each other.It seems that this theory of the actor would be amenable to empirical investigation. The methodologies of experimental economics could be adapted to study of the relational intelligence that Granovetter describes here.
Recent works by Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt explore related empirical questions about decision making in the context of problems involving fairness and reciprocity ( and 'The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories'; ).(These topics have come up in earlier discussions here. Here is a post on Chuck Tilly's treatment of trust networks;. Amartya Sen's discussion of 'rational fools' is relevant as well, as is his account of the role that commitments play in action. It seems likely that Granovetter would argue that Sen's solution is still too formalist, in that it attempts to internalize he social relations component into the actor's calculations. This is true of the 'identity economics' approach as well;.).
DeusDJsaid.I would only say that Granovetter's statement against oversocializing the individual was in terms of modelling.so that we don't model them behaving a certain way every time. I was just about to say that heterodox authors don't really do this, but it could be true that they make it implicit by ignoring all aspects of consumer choice within their models.I guess the question is, is this a problem in heterodox models today? Despite the fact that people like Lavoie (1994) came up with certain theorems regarding a heterodox consumer choice theory, I don't really think we've been able to incorporate into our models that seemingly have nothing to do with consumer choice based on the way we model.
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States Philosopher of social science with a strong interest in Asia. Books on social explanation, Marx, late imperial China, the philosophy of history, and the ethics of economic development. All these topics involve the complexities of social life and social change. As Marx believed, “people make their own histories, but not in circumstances of their own choosing.”See this interview published in 2008 in 5 Questions: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, edited by Diego Rios and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, that describes my approach to the philosophy of social science (bit.ly/interview0808).